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CHAPTER VII
THE TREATY ERA1
The United States had exclusive jurisdiction over its forces in
most, though not all,2 foreign countries in World War II. Our
allies did not, however, always grant the same immunity to other
friendly forces stationed in their territories,3 nor did the United
States to the forces of its allies stationed in the United States.4
Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Supreme Court
of New South Wales and the Mixed Court of Cassation of Egypt 5
supported the view that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the
United States over its forces by its allies was not compelled by
any rule of international law but was in the nature of a conces-
sion. Many of our allies emphasized that the grant of exclusive
jurisdiction was prompted by the circumstance of war and would
1 There are, in addition to the agreements which will be discussed below,
classified agreements with certain countries. No reference will be made
even to their existence, except where this has been made public, and the
situation will be described as though the agreements did not exist, although
this necessarily involves giving a distorted picture.
The significant agreements to which the United States is a party are
given in abridged form in the Appendix. Where no citation is given for an
agreement, it may be assumed it can be found in the Appendix. There are
no status of forces agreements with certain countries, e.g., Panama, Iran,
Hong Kong, Gibraltar.
2 The United States did not have exclusive jurisdiction under the Leased
Bases agreement.
8 The status of the forces of the United Kingdom's allies, other than the
United States and the Commonwealth countries, continued to be governed
throughout World War II by the Allied Forces Act, 1940. See p. 127, supra.
4 P. 131, supra.
8 Pages 135-138, supra. Several judges of the High Court of Australia took
occasion, in their opinions in Chow Hung Ching v. The King, 11 Commw.
L.R. 449 (Aust. 1948), to indicate their view that visiting foreign forces did
not enjoy a general immunity; their views differed as to the scope of any
limited immunity which might exist. The decision denying immunity to the
defendants was, however, based on the conclusion that they were not in any
event members of a military force.
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terminate with the end of hostilities. Their attitudes and actions
in the immediate post-war period showed that they considered
the distinction between war and peace significant, and were not
prepared to grant immunity to visiting forces in peacetime.
Canada in 1947 passed the Visiting Forces (United States of
America) Act 6 under which visiting foreign forces, including
those of the United States, did not enjoy immunity from local
criminal jurisdiction. 7 The United Kingdom, although it did not
repeal the United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, 1942,
until it implemented the NATO Agreement in 1952, repeatedly
raised the issue of termination of the Act. 8 In the meantime, in
e ll Geo. v [l],c. 47 (Can.).
7 Section 4(1) provided that: "Nothing in section three of this Act
[authorizing United States military authorities to exercise jurisdiction over
U.S. troops in Canada] shall affect the jurisdiction of any civil court in
Canada to try a member of a United States force for any act or omission
constituting an offence against any law in force in Canada whether or not
proceedings with respect to such act or omission have been instituted by a
United States service authority or before a United States service court."
Certain sections of the Criminal Code were, by Section 9(1), made inap-
plicable to a member of the United States force acting in the course of
his duty.
Mr. Claxton, Minister of National Defence, in introducing the bill to im-
plement the NATO agreement, said that "[W]ithout such legislation in effect
in this and other countries the forces of Canada and the other North At-
lantic treaty nations when in another country would have no more rights or
immunities than tourists. In respect of the laws of the country they were
visiting they would be in the same position as one traveling on civilian busi-
ness." H.C. Deb. (Canada), 2nd Session, 1951, Vol. 1, 1061.
s«* * * [T]he British indicated they would terminate it when the
hostilities were over and they sent official notes to us at least twice [April
30, 1948 and June 6, 1950], and several informal communications, that they
wanted to terminate this wartime situation.
"They indicated to us that they wanted to terminate this jurisdiction
which they had given to us entirely as a wartime measure. As a matter of
fact, they did it with great reluctance and only under conditions in which
they were in no position to refuse." Mr. Yingling, Department of State,
Hearings on H.R. 309, Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1955).
The Home Secretary stated in the Commons that "* * * [A]s various hon.
members have pointed out, the arrangements made in 1942 whereby excep-
tional privileges of exclusive jurisdiction were conferred on the United
States, while they might be appropriate in wartime and the aftermath of
war, are not appropriate for peace-time; and it would be better to substi-
tute our proposals of concurrent jurisdiction." 505 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.) 1588
(1952). See also the comment of Mr. Silverman, id., at 1069.
143
1948, it entered into an agreement with France which gave
British forces in France immunity from French jurisdiction only
for inter se offenses. 9 Some of the Western European countries
took an even firmer position with respect to the liability of our
forces to local criminal jurisdiction and in a few instances Ameri-
can troops were in fact tried in the local courts.10 The Brussels
Surprisingly, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Simonds, in moving the second
reading of the Bill implementing the NATO Agreement in the Lords, quoted
Oppenheim's views on the status of forces (infra, p. 197) and at least sug-
gested they reflected "the true position." 177 H.L. Deb. (5th ser.) 453
(1952).
9 U.K.T.S., 1948, No. 44.
"Article 4(1). The United Kingdom military authorities will exercise their
exclusive jurisdiction in the case of an offence committed by a member of
the United Kingdom Armed Forces in the following circumstances
:
(a) When the victim of the offence is a member of the United Kingdom
Armed Forces; or
(b) When the offence is contrary to United Kingdom military law but not
to French law.
In all other cases the French authorities will examine with the greatest
consideration any request which may be received from the United Kingdom
authorities, before a French Court has passed sentence, for the transfer of
the accused before a United Kingdom Military Court."
10 Many of the post-war agreements have not been published. The situa-
tion which prevailed before the NATO Agreement was ratified was sum-
marized in a letter of Acting Secretary of State Smith to Senator Wiley of
April 22, 1953, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "NATO Treaties," S.
Exec. Rep. No. 1, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
"My dear Senator Wiley: I understand that the question has been
raised as to the relation of the NATO status treaties with present
arrangements which we now have governing the criminal jurisdiction of
our forces abroad.
I think that the following points are controlling
:
1. As appears on page 28 of the record of the hearings before the
Committee on Foreign Relations on April 7 and 8, 'With respect to
criminal jurisdiction, we will have generally better rights under these
treaties than under the interim arrangements. The sole exception is
the situation in the United Kingdom* where the NATO formula will
shortly become applicable in any event. For example, in one case, we
have an interim arrangement where some of our personnel can be tried
by our authorities, while the remainder are entirely subject to local law.
This arrangement is an informal one and lacks legal standing.
In another case we do not even have exclusive jurisdiction of our
personnel for offenses committed in performance of official duty.
In a third case it is agreed that we will have exclusive jurisdiction
until the NATO status-of-forces treaty becomes effective; should it not
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become effective, we anticipate that this agreement would have to be
renegotiated.
In still another case we now have no jurisdiction over offenses of our
personnel against local law.
Other arrangements incorporate the terms of the NATO status-of-
forces agreement. In some cases we have no arrangements whatsoever.
All of the foregoing arrangements are informal ad hoc interim ar-
rangements providing a confusing and varying pattern of rights and
responsibilities. The arrangements have perforce been limited by the
existing legislation in each country, which in most cases is not as
favorable as that of the NATO status-of-forces formula. The present
arrangement therefore lacks operational uniformity as well as legal
sanction, and does not provide adequate protection of our forces abroad.
2. Under the present interim arrangements, we have been working
out our problems solely by reason of the cooperative spirit of the other
countries and their authorities. It is not easy for the authorities of
these other governments to cooperate with us in every case, as their
present legal structure in most cases does not provide for as favorable
treatment as that established by the treaties. The treaties would clarify,
codify, and authorize on a firm legal basis the treatment which has been
extended to us solely as a matter of grace and good will."
A letter from Secretary of Defense Wilson to Chairman Gordon of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, of July 1, 1957, Hearings on H.R.
8704, Before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
3447 (1957), reads in part:
"Prior to the ratification by the Italian Government of the NATO
Status of Forces Agreement, we had no status agreement with Italy.
During this period, the Italian Government felt obliged to take the
position under its constitution that our troops were entitled to no im-
munity from the jurisdiction of their courts. It also felt obliged under
Italian law to maintain that United States courts-martial could not
constitutionally operate on Italian soil. We do not believe that the
Italian view on either of these points can be written off as one of their
national idiosyncrasies."
See also the statement of General Hickman, Hearings Before a Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 35
(March 29, 31 and June 21, 1955), that in Italy prior to its ratification of
the NATO Agreement, jurisdiction was "governed by the Italian legal
system which precludes foreign courts from exercising jurisdiction within
Italian territory."
The French attitude is indicated by the statement of Deputy Under
Secretary of State Murphy that "in the debates in the French Parliament,
a good many members of the French Parliament would insist that they would
rather not have American troops there if they had to concede on the ques-
tion of jurisdiction." Hearings, H.J. Res. 309, supra, note 8, at 346.
In Nusselein v. Belgian State, Court of Cassation, 2d Chamber, Feb. 27,
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Treaty Powers made their position clear by entering into a status
of forces arrangement which provided that " 'Members of a
foreign force* who commit an offence in the 'receiving State*
against the laws in force in that State can be prosecuted in the
courts of the 'receiving State.' " " Even defeated Japan, where
the United States as an occupying power at first exercised exclu-
sive jurisdiction over its forces, insisted that the status of the
United States forces in Japan should be the same as in the NATO
countries when the NATO Agreement was ratified.12
1950, [1950] Int'l L. Rep. 136 (No. 35), it was held that a Belgian court
had jurisdiction over a Netherlands soldier for crimes committed against the
safety of the state in Belgium or abroad.
11 Agreement of December 21, 1949, 22 Dept. State Bull. 449, (March 20,
1950) Cmd. 7868. There was no exception to the recognition of the jurisdic-
tion of the receiving state, although it was enjoined to waive its jurisdiction
in certain instances.
A statement of the State Department submitted in the Hearings, H.J.
Res. 309, supra, note 8, at 290, read in part:
"[T]he Brussels Pact countries had already dealt with this question
in regard to their forces in the territories of each other before the
NATO Status of Forces negotiations began. This agreement * * *
recognized the full jurisdiction of the host state even as to duty offenses,
providing only for sympathetic consideration of requests for waiver.
These countries constituted the bulk of the NATO countries and these
had already shown their willingness to send forces although they
would be subject to the laws of their allies, and their unwillingness to
grant immunity from their own laws to the forces of their allies."
13 The Administrative Agreement with Japan under Article III of the
Security Treaty, February 28, 1952, 3 UST 3341, TIAS 2492, provided:
"ARTICLE XVII
1. Upon the coming into force with respect to the United States of
the 'Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty re-
garding the Status of their Forces', signed at London on June 19, 1951,
the United States will immediately conclude with Japan, at the option
of Japan, an agreement on criminal jurisdiction similar to the cor-
responding provisions of that Agreement."
During the Hearings on H.J. Res 309, supra, note 8, at 324, Congressman
LeCompte read into the record an editorial from the Des Moines Register
which said
:
"During the World War II emergency, several countries gave the
United States temporarily, the right to try United States soldiers
charged with civilian crimes abroad, but this couldn't last. Higher pay
and higher living standards are irritating enough without extraterri-
torial rights in criminal law.
"Western countries used to insist on such rights in Eastern lands and
this was a terrific grievance to Japanese, Turkish, and Chinese national
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Several reasons are discernible as to why states which had been
willing to grant immunity to visiting forces in war-time were
unwilling to do so in time of peace. A grant for the duration of
pride until the 'capitulations' and the 'unequal treaties' were at last
canceled many years ago. The United States can hardly expect that
kind of special rights on a permanent basis anywhere today."
Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy commented (Id., at 325) :
"What is said in that editorial about capitulations, of course, provides
the backdrop for the emotional situation that you have in the Japanese
Parliament, on this very subject, because they did submit to a capitula-
tory system for a number of years and now their self-assertion is very
great and any concession of jurisdiction on their part is quite an
enormous thing. That is why we are gratified that the NATO Status
of Forces formula is applicable to Japan."
Again Mr. Murphy said (Id., at 288) :
"I was acquainted with a great many members of their Diet who want
our forces there, sincerely want our forces there, and who I think ap-
preciate the value to Japan of their presence.
"At the same time, on an emotional issue like this court jurisdictional
question—and I discussed it with many of them—you have to think of the
history connected with it, the distinction that is made between the races,
the fact that capitulations existed in that area. You have a whole
emotional historical background for this purpose.
"I am convinced if we today, regardless of the major elements that you
talk about, and where the line of defense is and where the major in-
terests of the country should lie, that on an emotional question like this
one in the Japanese Diet tomorrow we would get less than we have today.
That is my honest conviction, just based on the observation that I made
while I was there.
"I want to make that distinction between the factors that you mention
of the larger strategic concepts, the appreciation of the population,
where their major interests lie, and this issue."
In the Hearing on H.R. 8704 of July 24, 1957, supra, note 10, at 3460-61,
Mr. Murphy said of the negotiation with Japan
:
"We were faced with the grim determination on the part of the
Japanese legislative body * * * the impact of their opinion on the
Government was very clear and very determined. Because they insisted
that as soon as the NATO status-of-forces formula was accepted by the
other nations, they could not accept anything less. * * * There was a
great sensitivity about equality and sovereignty, which was a growing
body of public opinion, which was reflected in their Diet."
Japan had asserted jurisdiction over British sailors from the warship
Belfast for an offence committed on shore (robbing of a taxi driver) in
June 1952, although the warship had been engaged in action in Korean
waters until just before her visit to Kobe. Japan v. Smith and Stinner, High
Court of Osaka (Sixth Criminal Division), Nov. 5, 1952, [1952] Intfl L. Rep.
221, (No. 47).
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the war was thought of in terms of a short period. The present
uneasy peace is thought of as likely to last for an indefinite
period.13 The need for the presence of foreign troops is as real;
however, it may not be so obvious and urgent to the general
public. Military exigency may require that a commander retain
as complete control over his troops in peace as in war, but the
argument is seemingly less compelling. Since war could break
out at any moment, it is possible that the exercise of jurisdiction
over visiting troops by the receiving state could interfere with
military operations as much as in war-time.
Troops in time of war are exposed repeatedly to danger and
hardship. No one is likely to think of them then as a privileged
class. In time of peace, danger and hardship lie largely in the
uncertain future—troops have more leisure, travel facilities are
more readily available, and they are more likely to mingle with
the local population. Perhaps for these reasons the people of a
receiving state are psychologically less prepared to accept what
they view as an infringement of their state's sovereignty, through
granting immunity to foreign troops, as they are less prepared to
accept a curtailment of their own rights and privileges.14 A
comparable shift in the attitude toward the appropriate preroga-
tives and perquisites of a state's own armed forces has occurred
often enough. The rise of nationalism since World War II has
accented these tendencies in some areas, and in certain instances
unhappy memories of extraterritoriality have made their contri-
bution. Even in the United Kingdom, sensitivity regarding the
proper recognition of its sovereign equality has been a larger
factor than might have been anticipated.15
18 "[T] his is the first time that we have ever really envisaged a state of
affairs in which visiting forces in large numbers would spend an indefinite
period on British soil in what is technically a time of peace. * * * That
makes a great deal of difference." Viscount Bridgeman, 177 H.L. Deb. (5th
ser.) 471, (1952).
14 "Recently nations have found it necessary to their security to permit
foreign armies to remain in their territory for indefinite periods. Under
these circumstances the receiving state is naturally concerned with the
protection of its citizens and, except in unusual circumstances, will be
reluctant to waive, expressly or impliedly, the right to assert jurisdiction
over offenses against local law in matters affecting them." Draft Restate-
ment, Foreign Relations, Sec. 44, Comment a at 137 (Tent. Draft No.
2,1958).
16 Perhaps half the debate in Parliament on the Bill implementing the
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After World War II, the United States withdrew from its posi-
tion that its troops abroad were in all circumstances entitled to
immunity under international law, 16 and turned to the negotia-
tion of status of forces treaties. 17 What may be called the treaty
NATO Agreement related to ensuring that the United States granted
reciprocal treatment to British forces stationed in the United States. All
concerned agreed that reciprocity was essential although all understood that
no significant number of British troops were likely to be stationed in the
United States.
16 The Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, Section 60, p. 189, states
:
"Except as provided in Sees. 61 and 62, a state's consenting to the presence
of a foreign force within its territory does not of itself imply that the state
waives its right to exercise enforcement jurisdiction over members of the
force for violations of the criminal law of the territorial state."
Comment a to Section 60 states in part that "The concern of the terri-
torial state with the protection of persons and property normally precludes
the implication of such a waiver. Exceptions to the rule stated in this Sec-
tion arise only when the exercise of local jurisdiction would be inconsistent
with the reason for granting entry to the force or would prevent effective
prosecution of its mission."
The Reporters' Note to Section 60, p. 191, distinguishes The Schooner Ex-
change, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) as concerning troops in passage,
and cites the opinion of the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524
(1956) as well as the British attitude in World War II.
17
It nevertheless gave ground only grudgingly. In the NATO negotiations
the United States Representative noted that the Article on criminal jurisdic-
tion "was based on the principle that the jurisdiction of the receiving State
applied to 'foreign forces and civilian personnel, hereafter described by the
term 'contingents.' This principle, on which the United States Draft was
based, differed from International Law which provided that, in the absence
of any special agreement, the sending State retained the right of jurisdiction
over its forces stationed outside the national territory. The International
Law on the subject was largely inspired by the decision of Chief Justice
Marshall in the case of The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116 (1812)." MS-R (51) 4. A discussion in the Juridical Sub-
committee indicates the Netherlands representative agreed with this view,
but the Belgian and Italian representatives did not. MS-(J)-R (51) 2.
The NATO Agreement was negotiated by a Working Group, assisted by a
Juridical Subcommittee, and referred for approval to the NATO Council
Deputies. The available materials on the deliberations of the Working Group
consist of the Summary Record of their meetings, MS-R (51) 1-26 and
Documents, MS-D (51) 1-34; those on the work of the Juridical Subcom-
mittee consist of the Summary Record of their meetings, MS-(J)-R (51)
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era has not, however, been characterized by an abandonment of
efforts to secure the maximum protection for American troops
abroad. Nor has it meant ignoring the established bases for de-
termining jurisdiction. These have continued to shape the at-
titudes of treaty negotiators, and have in a sense marked out
the permissible limits of negotiation. It has been recognized,
however, that the invocation of such abstract ideas as the terri-
torial principle provides no clear and acceptable answer to many
practical problems. The circumstances in which troops are sta-
tioned abroad are too varied, and the interests of the sending and
receiving states too complex. Treaties have made possible more
subtle differentiations in the allocation of jurisdiction, taking ac-
count of the multiple interests of sending and receiving states
and the complex and differing scales through which they must be
equated. Perhaps not all the treaty arrangements represent the
optimum allocation of jurisdiction, but experience suggests that
on the whole they have created a more workable pattern. Inter-
national frictions have been reduced—no system has been devised
which could eliminate them altogether.
The NATO Agreement is the most important of the post-war
treaties. Perhaps the majority of our forces abroad are governed
by its provisions, if one takes into account the arrangements with
Japan and Iceland which are virtually identical. The Agreement
with West Germany incorporates its provisions. Moreover, it has
become the bench mark from which all status of forces arrange-
ments are measured. The United States Senate has made it clear
it will approve no arrangement which gives American troops a
status inferior to that given them by the NATO Agreement. On
the other hand, states outside NATO have not uncommonly asked
for no less jurisdiction than the NATO Agreement gives a re-
ceiving state, in effect taking what may be termed a most-favored-
nation approach. There are, however, agreements with non-
NATO countries which reflect certain local circumstances and
give the United States exclusive jurisdiction over its own forces.
1-6. Professor Joseph M. Snee, S.J., was kind enough to make copies of
these materials available to the writer.
For the actions of the Council Deputies, references in that most valuable
source, Snee & Pye, Status of Forces Agreements and Criminal Jurisdic-
tion (1957) have been used.
It should be borne in mind always that the above materials are reporters*
summaries, not verbatim transcripts of the proceedings.
150
Agreements for Exclusive Jurisdiction
A multipartite Convention between the United States, the
United Kingdom, France and West Germany of 1952, as amended
in 1954 governed the status of American forces in West Germany
until July 1, 1963, when the present Agreement became effective.
The Convention stated: "(1) Except as otherwise provided in the
present Convention, the authorities of the Forces shall ex-
ercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction over members of the
Forces * * *." 18 An Exchange of Notes of July 12, 1950 (the in-
vasion of South Korea began June 25, 1950), which gives exclu-
sive jurisdiction over members of the United States Military
Establishment in Korea to courts-martial of the United States, is
still in effect. 19 The Ethiopian Agreement of May 22, 1953 which
gives the United States the right to occupy and use certain mili-
tary facilities and installations in Ethiopia likewise gives the
United States exclusive jurisdiction over its forces.20 In the
18 Article 6, par. 2, provided : "Where under the law of the Power con-
cerned, the service tribunals are not competent to exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion over a member of the Forces, the German courts and authorities may
exercise criminal jurisdiction over him in respect of an offense under German
law committed against German interests" on certain conditions. [1955] 4
UST 4288, TIAS No. 3425.
19 The Exchange of Notes does not cover the United States Military Advi-
sory Group to Korea. The Agreement to establish the Military Advisory
Group, January 26, 1950, 2 UST 2696, TIAS No. 2436, 178 U.N.T.S. 102,
provides in Article IV that "The Group and its dependents will be con-
sidered as a part of the Embassy of the United States in the Republic of
Korea for the purposes of enjoying the privileges and immunities accorded
to the Embassy and its personnel of comparable rank."
An earlier Agreement of August 24, 1948, [1951] 79 U.N.T.S. 62, had
provided that "the Commanding General, United States Armed Forces in
Korea, shall retain exclusive jurisdiction over the personnel of his command,
both military and civilian, including their dependents, whose conduct as
individuals shall be in keeping with the pertinent laws of the Republic of
Korea."
The New York Times, June 23, 1962, p. 2, reported that the United States
had agreed to negotiate a status of forces agreement with South Korea.
"Such an agreement would give Korea jurisdiction over the American troops
for crimes committed while off duty."
20 The Agreement (Art. XVII, Part 1) provides simply that: "* * * 3.
Members of the United States forces shall be immune from the criminal
jurisdiction of Ethiopian courts. * * *" An Agreement of December 19, 1944,
93 U.N.T.S. 320, between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia gave the
United Kingdom exclusive jurisdiction over its forces. See par. 5 of the
Annexure to Article VI.
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Agreement with Denmark for the Defense of Greenland provi-
sion is made that: "The Government of the United States of
America shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over those defense areas in Greenland for which it is responsible
under Article II (3), and over any offenses which may be com-
mitted in Greenland by the aforesaid military or civilian person-
nel or by members of their families, as well as by other persons
within such defense areas except Danish nationals, * * *" 21 To
these agreements one should add the many Mutual Defense and
Military Aid agreements to which the United States is a party.
Although these agreements differ in detail, in general they recog-
nize the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States over the per-
sonnel assigned to implement the agreements. Normally this is
accomplished by assimilating such personnel to members of the
diplomatic mission.22
Finally, there are those agreements which differentiate be-
tween war and peace. The negotiators of the NATO Agreement
discussed at several sessions whether the Agreement should be
drafted to govern in time of war.23 They were in accord that the
21 Article VIII. The World War II Agreement of April 9, 1941, E.A.S. No.
204, 35 A.J.I.L. (Supp.) 129 (1941) provided in Article VI that: "* * * the
Government of the United States of America shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over any such defense area in Greenland and over military and
civilian personnel of the United States, and their families, as well as over
all other persons within such areas except Danish citizens and native
Greenlanders * * *."
" "In Yugoslavia, Spain, Greece, Ethiopia, and Thailand, military as-
sistance advisory group personnel enjoy full diplomatic immunity. In Iran,
Iraq, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia they are subject to the concurrent jurisdic-
tion of the United States and local courts.
"In the Philippines, senior officers enjoy full diplomatic immunities, while
others are subject to jurisdiction of Philippine courts to the extent that
other members of our forces stationed therein are subject thereto.
"In the Netherlands, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Norway, Belgium,
France, Korea, Japan, Pakistan, Formosa, Brazil, Indonesia, Indochina,
Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Portugal, Chile, and Italy, their status is that of
personnel of corresponding rank of the United States diplomatic mission."
Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, Hearings, H.J. Res. 309,
supra, note 8, at 304.
See part 3 of the Reporters' Note to Section 65 of the Restatement,
Foreign Relations Law, p. 209, for a discussion of the status of military
advisory and assistance groups.
"The original United States Draft, as explained by the United States
Representative, "provided that in time of war the sending State shall exer-
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arrangements as to criminal jurisdiction on which these discus-
sions centered were appropriate only for a time of peace.24 The
effort to formulate correlative arrangements to govern in time of
war was finally abandoned. Rather the Agreement provides for
review and modification by bilateral agreement of the parties
concerned, reinforced by the right of any party to suspend any
provision on sixty days' notice, in the event of hostilities.25 The
United States gave explicit notice that it would, in time of war,
cise sole jurisdiction in the case of offences committed by the members of its
'contingents'. This had a purely practical purpose: in time of war, it would
be inadvisable that members of the force or assimilated personnel should be
withdrawn from the control of their military authorities by reason of their
subjection to the jurisdiction of the receiving State. The assumption of para-
graph 10 did not appear in the Brussels Agreement, since the latter did not
provide for time of war." MS-R (51) 4.
The United States later put forward a proposal that the Agreement should
provide that "* * * in time of hostilities * * * the sending State shall have
* * * the primary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over members of its
forces committing any offence within a receiving State except a security
offense * * * committed against the receiving State." MS-D (51) 2. The
United States later withdrew this proposal "as the whole question of condi-
tions in war-time were being dealt with separately." MS-(J)-R (51) 5. See
also MS-(J)-R (41) 9; MS-D (51) 11; MS-D (51) 11 (Revise); MS-D
(51) 11 (2nd Revise); MS-R (51) 6; MS-R (51) 20.
2* The French representative, in the course of a general discussion in the
Juridical Subcommittee of the appropriateness of the proposed jurisdictional
arrangements for war-time, observed "he thought that only Articles VII [on
criminal jurisdiction] and VIII, and possibly III in so far as it referred to
immigration regulations, might have to be withdrawn."
""ARTICLE XV
1. Subject to paragraph 2 of this Article, this Agreement shall remain in
force in the event of hostilities to which the North Atlantic Treaty applies,
except that the provisions for settling claims in paragraphs 2 and 5 of
Article VIII shall not apply to war damage, and that the provisions of the
Agreement, and, in particular of Articles III and VII, shall immediately be
reviewed by the Contracting Parties concerned, who may agree to such
modifications as they may consider desirable regarding the application of
the Agreement between them.
2. In the event of such hostilities, each of the Contracting Parties shall
have the right, by giving 60 days' notice to the other Contracting Parties to
suspend the application of any of the provisions of this Agreement so far as
it is concerned. If this right is exercised, the Contracting Parties shall im-
mediately consult with a view to agreeing on suitable provisions to replace
the provisions suspended."
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insist on exclusive jurisdiction over its armed forces.26 Other
agreements similarly provide expressly for a shift in the arrange-
ment regarding criminal jurisdiction in the event of war, to give
the United States exclusive jurisdiction over its forces.27
It may seem odd to group together agreements so diverse as
those just reviewed, simply because they provide for or con-
template the possibility of exclusive jurisdiction in the United
States as the sending state. The significant point, however, is
the very diversity of the situations covered by these agreements.
They demonstrate that there is no real norm with respect to the
status of forces problem. Specifically, they show that there are a
variety of situations in which exclusive jurisdiction in the sending
state is or may be appropriate. The Convention with West
2« «The United States Representative further recalled that in time of war
the United States Government considered that those provisions relating to
jurisdiction over its forces which were included in the Agreement, would no
longer be adequate. In the event of hostilities, the United States Government
desired to be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over their forces. He
realized that under Article XV the United States Government had the right
to denounce the Agreement in so far as the provisions in question were
concerned." MS-R (51) 20. See also note 23, supra.
27 The Agreement of March 14, 1947 with the Philippines, provides (Article
XIII, 6) that "Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, it is mutually
agreed that in time of war the United States shall have the right to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over all offences which may be committed by members
of the armed forces of the United States in the Philippines."
The revised Leased Bases Agreement with the United Kingdom spells out
in detail the allocation of jurisdiction in war and in peace.
The criminal jurisdiction provisions of the Bahama Islands Agreement so
closely parallel those of the revised Leased Bases Agreement that here as
elsewhere references to the provisions of the revised Leased Bases Agree-
ment may be considered as references to the Bahama Islands Agreement
as well.
The Agreement with the Federation of the West Indies does not, on the
other hand, call for any change in the agreed arrangements in the event
of war.
The Agreement with the Dominican Republic provided in Art. XV (1) (a)
that "Except as provided in subparagraph (b), the Government of the
United States of America shall have the right to exercise exclusive criminal
jurisdiction over any offenses committed in the Dominican Republic by: (i)
Members of the United States Forces; (ii) Other persons subject to the
United States military law except Dominican nationals or local aliens."
Subparagraph (b) provided that "During a period of hostilities in which
either government is engaged the principle stated in subparagraph (a)
shall apply."
154
Germany was explicable as an interim arrangement for the
period succeeding occupation. The Agreement regarding Green-
land is plainly the product of the physical environment. Mili-
tary personnel assigned to missions under Mutual Assistance
Agreements do not constitute a military force, but serve in an
advisory capacity. This makes their assimilation to the personnel
of an embassy not unreasonable. The Agreement with Korea re-
flects the fact that, given the military build-up in North Korea,
American troops in South Korea are necessarily maintained on
a combat basis. Also, South Korea has relatively recently been
ravaged by war, and this means that its social and governmental
institutions, including its courts, were disorganized; there is also
the continuing danger of Communist infiltration. Finally, there
are many reasons for differentiating a war-time and peace-time
situation, although the difference does not necessarily imply that
a sending state should have exclusive jurisdiction in time of
war. 28
The NATO Agreement
At the time the NATO Agreement was negotiated, Western
Europe presented a quite different situation, for reasons which
have no relation to the inherent capacity of a people to establish
and maintain a just system of criminal law. The military threat
was not so acute as in Korea, and there had been time since the
end of World War II to reconstitute and revitalize the courts. The
threat of Communist infiltration, while real enough, could ap-
parently be effectively controlled. The number of visiting forces
—
particularly American forces—to be stationed in some of the
Western European countries was expected to be large, much larger
than in, say, Ethiopia. It was anticipated that they would be
stationed in many different places in a single country, in circum-
stances which made likely much intermingling with the local
population. Language barriers, although they existed, could be
surmounted with relative ease. The legal systems of the several
countries differed among each other and from that of the United
States, but had enough common roots to make their major con-
cepts familiar or at least readily understandable.
28 The Agreement with Lebanon of August 6, 1958 provided, with respect
to the status of the American forces then in the Lebanon, that "The mili-
tary authorities of the United States shall have the exclusive right to
exercise all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction over all persons subject to
its military law."
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The Brussels Treaty Powers had shown their conviction that,
in the conditions prevailing in Western Europe, the territorial
principle should control, and visiting forces should enjoy no
blanket immunity. The NATO Agreement reflects a modification
of this attitude, but the territorial principle remains the norm.
The Agreement, in keeping with that principle, for practical
purposes gives the receiving state primary jurisdiction, and the
sending state only secondary, subordinate jurisdiction over all
offenses except those arising out of acts in the performance of
duty and offenses in which both the offender and the victim are
members of or accompany the armed forces. With respect to the
excepted offenses, the sending state has primary jurisdiction.
It will be recalled that, in general, international law establishes
no rules of priority where two or more states have concurrent
jurisdiction over the same offense. The useful, conflict-resolving
concept of "primary jurisdiction'' and "secondary jurisdiction"
is, in the status of forces area, a creation of treaties. It ap-
parently first appeared in the Agreement of March 27, 1941, re-
lating to the Leased Bases, and reached full flower in the NATO
Agreement. Broadly speaking, however, the concept of primary
and secondary jurisdiction is not new. It is involved somewhat in
extradition treaties in those instances where a state may be re-
quested to surrender one of its own nationals to the state where
the offense occurred, even though the requested state could other-
wise try this individual under its own laws. The same is true
where an offense occurs on a merchant vessel in a foreign port.
On the basis at least of comity the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction is accorded the littoral state or the flag state, depend-
ing on such factors as whether the peace of the port was dis-
turbed. The state of which the offending seaman is a national is,
moreover, normally prepared to recognize the prior right of either
the littoral or the flag state to exercise jurisdiction. Every im-
munity, moreover, can be said to involve no more than the
recognition of a primary right to exercise jurisdiction, since an
immunity can always be waived.
Formerly, in the status of forces area, either the sending state
(or on occasion the receiving state, e.g., the United Kingdom,
under the Allied Forces Act, 1940, with respect to murder, man-
slaughter and rape) successfully claimed exclusive jurisdiction;
or, where the concurrent jurisdiction of the sending and receiving
state was recognized, each case was a matter for separate negotia-
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tion. Physical custody of the accused was presumably the most
important factor. Thus, in Great Britain, neither the Visiting
Forces (British Commonwealth) Act, 1933, nor the Allied Forces
Act (1940) except with regard to the offenses mentioned above,
made any provision for resolving the conflict inherent in the
recognition of concurrent jurisdiction in the sending and re-
ceiving states. The use of the concept of primary and secondary
jurisdiction to resolve such conflicts in advance represents a
notable forward step.
The NATO Agreement also accords jurisdiction to the sending
state—necessarily exclusive—over offenses solely punishable by
the law of the sending state. This is significant largely with re-
spect to security offenses and purely military offenses, e.g.,
AWOL. Since the receiving state could not exercise jurisdiction
in these cases, the grant is not of immunity but simply of the
right to exercise jurisdiction. The inclusion of the provision was
probably unnecessary.
To summarize briefly, our allies have, since the end of World
War II, made it clear they neither agreed that any rule of in-
ternational law required they accord a sending state exclusive
jurisdiction over its forces, nor believed that granting such ex-
clusive jurisdiction was, except in special circumstances, ap-
propriate at least in time of peace. The United States has ac-
cordingly obtained by negotiated agreements a qualified status
for its armed forces.
